



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

POLICY

22 FEB 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE


SUBJECT: Draft Revision of DCID 1/16

This is in response to your memorandum SECOM-D-386 of February 3, 1983, subject as above, which provided the draft revision of DCID 1/16 for review and comment. Also noted in this regard is your memorandum SECOM-D-035 of February 7, 1983, subject as above, which indicated required format changes for the subject DCID.

Our specific recommended changes are appended, provided on separate pages in a "line-out/line-in" format as requested. Also attached are our thoughts on classification of the DCID.

The majority of these changes, however, are directly related to a significant issue which we wish to highlight. This is the broad issue of the DCID's applicability and the concurrent intersection of the DCID provisions with Federal Department/Agency implementations of the provisions of Executive Order 12356. With a multitude of DoD field automated information systems concurrently processing both collateral intelligence and collateral non-intelligence, the possible policy confusion, conflict and unwarranted duplication of effort that could result from separate and different policies governing each type of classified information is a matter of significant concern to us. We fail to see a need for parallel and differing policies for collateral classified intelligence as such. It is our view that such intelligence is adequately covered by existing implementations of EO 12356 and the special handling requirements additionally promulgated by DCID 1/7. Accordingly, we recommend that the applicability of DCID 1/16, in a fashion similar to DCID 1/19, be limited to those types of SCI, and other specific categories of intelligence for which formal systems of compartmentation are established that require security measures beyond those normally provided for collateral classified information pursuant to EO 12356.

A second problem area for Defense results partially from the foregoing and involves the definitions of "Dedicated" and "System High" modes. In contrast to the "Compartmented" and "Expanded Compartmented" modes which are defined in terms of SCI processing, these two modes in DCID 1/16 do not necessarily relate to SCI and thereby create a direct intersection with Department/Agency computer security policies for collateral classified information. Moreover, the conceptual basis for these modes differs from ours and NATO's. DoD and NATO policies distinguish these two modes on the basis of need-to-know as a required security function--This function is implemented in the Dedicated mode external to the system, prior to system access being granted, and a System High system implements the requirement internally by hardware/software mechanism. An added benefit of this basis for distinction is that it can be rather clearly correlated with the proposed technical criteria being developed by the DoD Computer Security Evaluation Center at NSA. By contrast, the DCI Regulation defines Dedicated in terms of "one particular type of intelligence information," with the System High mode not having this limitation. We would like to see DoD and DCI policies similar on this, particularly in view of the applicability issue cited above. Toward that end, we would like to better understand the intent and purpose of the proposed Dedicated and System High modes, since it appears to us that the DOD/NATO definitions are more clearly delineated and more easily related to the the emerging technical security evaluation criteria.


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